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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
BANKS AND BANKING - REORGANIZATION OF INSOLVENT BANKS
BY BANKING COMMISSIONER - IMPAIRMENT OF OBLIGATION OF CON-
TRACT OF DEPOSITORS. - Defendant bank, being insolvent, closed
its doors in October, 1931, and reopened under the same name and
management in November, 1931. The reorganization was accom-
plished under the statute of 1929 and the ruling of the banking
commissioner requiring 66 2/3 per cent. of the stockholders to pay
a voluntary assessment on their stock in consideration of 66 2/3
per cent. of depositors consenting to the freezing of their deposits
over a period of years. On March 2, 1933, the banking commis-
sioner, pursuant to the statute of Mlarch 1, 1933, required the de-
fendant further to restrict deposits. Plaintiff, not having as-
sented to the agreement of reorganization, sues to recover in her
own right a savings account deposited in 1930 and as executrix a
checking account deposited in 1930. Held: The reorganization
statute of 1929 was constitutional, and where a common fund
is involved a small minority shall not defeat the wishes of an over-
whelming majority: semble, that the ruling of March 2, 1933,
violated no constitutional rights. Timmons v. Peoples Trust Com-
pany."
It has long been recognized that a state in the absence of con-
flicting federal legislation may enact insolvency laws permitting a
substantial per cent. of creditors to bind the non-consenting
minority in some sort of composition or compromise.! Several
states have provided that in an agreement for reorganization of
an insolvent corporation a three-fourths majority in value of
1173 S. E. 79 (W. Va. 1934) (two actions). The reorganization agree-
ment provided that one-half of checking dccounts would be payable in 1934
and the remaining half in 1935, that one-half of the savings accounts would
be payable in 1936 and the remaining half in 1937. The notice for with-
drawal of savings accounts was changed from 30 days to si:x months. De-
positors not assenting were to be paid when sufficient assets were collected.
Actually 85 per cent. of depositors and stockholders complied with the plan.
The ruling of the banking commissioner of March 2, 1933, required the
bank to retain 50 per cent. of all deposits until October, 1936, and the re-
maining 50 per cent. until October, 1937.
2 Brown v. Smart, 145 U. S. 454, 12 S. Ct. 958 (1891); Denny v. Bennett,
128 U. S. 489, 9 S. Ct. 134 (1888). In Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat.
122 (1819), the insolvent statute was held invalid only as to the facts of the
case. There the date of the contract was March, 1811, and the act pleaded
as a defense was passed in April, 1811.
But such insolvency laws do not apply to creditors of a foreign state.
Ogden v. Sanders, 12 Wheat. 213 (1827); Security Trust Co. v. Dodd, 173
U. S. 624, 19 S. Ct. 545 (1899).
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creditors in a given class shall bind the non-assenting ones.' In each
instance such legislation does not impair the obligation of contracts
made subsequent thereto because it becomes a part of the contract
made between parties.'
Proceeding on this premise certain states in recent years, be-
cause of the prevailing economic conditions, have adopted bank
reorganization statutes giving to a requisite per cent. of depositors
the power to bind the non-assenting minority in freezing deposits
of an insolvent bank, until the bank is able to pay in full or in
part.' But the West Virginia law, involved in the present case, is
very broad and general leaving as it does the whole plan of re-
organization practically in control of the banking commissioner ;'
and because of this feature it seems arguable that such a statute
might not become a part of a subsequent contract as the rulings of
the banking commissioner actually determine the rights of the
3 "DEr _ E GEN. Cor. LAwS (1931) § 5 (9); KENTUCKY STAT. (Car-
roll 1930) § 771a (Reorganization of Insolvent Railroads and Bridge Com-
panies); NEW YORK STOCK CORP. L w (1930) §§ 95-99; WEST VIROINIA OFF.
CODE (1931) ch. 31, art. 1, § 6(h) ; MINNESOTA, LAWS OF 1933, ch. 300, § 54.
See also Gilfillan v. Union Canal Co., 109 U. S. 401, 3 S. Ct. 304 (1883)."
This footnote is from a collection of statutes listed by Billig, Corporate Re-
organization: Some Becent Developments, 18 MINN. L. REV. 14 at 21 (1933).
'Abilene Nat. Bank v. Dolley, 228 U. S. 1, 33 S. Ct. 409 (1913); C. B. &
Q. R. R. Co. v. Cram, 228 U. S. 70, 33 S. Ct. 437 (1913),; Farmers' and
Merchants' Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 U. S. 649, 43 S. Ct. 651
(1923).
5 LAws OF FLA. (1927), ch. 11849 and amended by acts of 1929, ch. 14553
(requiring 75 per cent. of total deposits) ; KENTUCKY STATS. §§ 165a-17 (1932
Supp.) (agreement must be signed by depositors representing 75 per cent. of
deposits); Minnesota, Mason Minn. Stats. (1927), §§ 7690-1, 2 (requiring 90
per cent. of deposits and unsecured creditors); North Dakota, Laws of 1927,
ch. 99, § 20 (requiring 80 per cent. of deposits); South Dakota, Laws of
1925, ch. 104 (requiring 80 per cent. of deposits at date of suspension).
For cases holding the above statutes valid see Dorman v. Dell, 245 Ky. 34,
52 S. W. (2d) 892 (1932); McConville v. Ft. Pierce Bank & Trust Co., 101
Fla. 727, 135 So. 392 (1931); Becker v. Amos, 105 Fla. 231, 141 So. 136
(1932); Hoff v. First State Bank, 174 Minn. 36, 218 N. W. 238 (1928);
Paul v. Farmers' and Merchants' State Bank, 387 Minn. 411, 245 N. W. 832
(1932); Sueltz v. Bank of Hazelton, 61 N. D. 528, 238 N. W. 649 (1931);
Farmers' and Merchants' Bank of Tomlison, 225 N. W. 305 (S. D., 1929).
See 80 A. L. B. 1480 (1932).
6W. VA. RBv. CODE (1931) c. 31, art. 8, § 29 (Acts of 1929, c. 23, § 31)
"In any voluntary or compulsory proceeding to liquidate a banking institu-
tion, such banking institution, if the proceeding be not in court, with the con-
sent in writing of the commissioner of banking, and if the proceeding be in
court, with the consent in writing of the commissioner of banking and the
approval of the court, may reorganize, reclaim possession of its assets, and
continue in business .... y
Apparently the only law similar to the West Virginia statute is an Arizona
statute, Aniz. CODE (Struckneyer, 1928) § 245, which provides that an in-
solvent bank may resume business upon such conditions as the banking com-
missioner may approve. No case involving this statute was found. See
Note (1930) 28 MICH. L. Rv. 1052.
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depositors. Beyong this objection, however, such a statute is as-
suredly valid as to subsequent deposits and bridges a gap in in-
olvency administration, since the federal bankruptcy act does not
apply to banking corporations, and the liquidation of national
banks only is regulated by the federal banking laws.' It, also,
might be advisable to require a 100 per cent. of stockholders to
pay the assessment on their stock.'
Yet as to the statute of March, 1933, and the order of the
banking commissioner made pursuant thereto, the question of the
impairment of the obligation of contracts is squarely presented,'
since the contracts of deposits were prior to the law.' However,
what constitutes a violation of the contract clause is uncertain.'
Charters and franchises granted by a state or governmental sub-
division, and contracts between a public utility and private parties
fixing charges are subject to modification by later legislation and
orders.' The existence of an emergency or economic disturbance,
7Bankruptcy Act, § 4, 11 U. S. C. A. § 22a.
8 Compare the provisions of the federal Bank Conservation Act of March
9, 1933, 12 U. S. C. A. §§ 201-211, 1 MAsoN's U. S. CODE, tit. 12, §§ 201-211.
°In the reorganization of corporations in an equity receivership proceeding,
it is held that the rights of creditors are superior to those of stockholders.
Northern Pacific Railway v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482, 33 S. Ct. 554 (1928). It
seems that before a non-consenting depositor's rights are affected all the
shareholders should be required to pay the stock assessment.
'0 Art. 1, § 10, U. S. Const.
'Acts of Legislature (Reg. Sess. 1933), Ch. 12. "The Commissioner of
banking may, by and with the consent of the governor, permit or require any
bank or banking institution authorized to do business in this state, or "any
number or all of such banks or banking institutions, to: (1) Operate and do
business in such manner and under such limitations and regulations as the
banking commissioner, with the approval of the governor, may prescribe, or,
(2) Cease business for such period of time as the banking commissioner,
with the approval of the governor, may direct, in which case the period of
cessation shall be held to be a legal holiday, as now defined, as to such bank
or banks. See the very important Bank Conservator Statute of April 12,
1933, Acts of W. Va. (Extraordinary Sess.), ch. 5.
"C. Bunn, The Impairment of Contracts: Mortgage and Iiurance
Moratoria, 1 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 249 (1933); Home Building and Loan Ass'n
v. Blaisdell, - U. S. 5, 54 S. Ct. 231 (1934) ; but of., W. B. Worthen Co.
v. Thomas, - U. S. 5 54 S. Ct. 816, (1934).
3Public Service Commission v. Harpers Ferry and Potomac Bridge Co.,
171 S. E. 760 (W. Va. 1933) ; Laurel Fork and Sand Hill R. R. Co. v. W. Va.
Transportation Co., 25 W. Va. 324 (1884); Chicago & Alto R. R. Co. v.
Tranbarger, 238 U. S. 67, 35 S. Ct. 678 (1915); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S.
113, 94 L. Ed. 77 (1876). See Note (1919) 26 W. VA. L. Q. 67.
But compare Piqua Branch of the State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 How.
369 (1853), holding that a bank chartering act requiring the officers of a
bank to declare semi-annual dividends and to pay six per cent of such
dividends to the state which would be in lieu of all other taxation was a con-
tract between the state and the bank and was impaired by a later act taxing
all banks the same as other property. See Shelby County v. Union and
Planter's Bank, 161 U. S. 149, 16 S. Ct. 558 (1895); Bank of Commerce v.
Tennessee, 163 U. S. 416, 16 S. Ct. 1113 (1895); Grand Lodge v. New
Orleans, 166 U, S. 143, 17 8, Ct, 523 (1896).
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while not creating any power, may furnish the occasion for the
legislature to alter existing rights." Generally, it has been said,
a state under the police power may carry out any policy necessary
for the protection of the health, morals and general welfare of its
people, even though contractual obligations be occasionally im-
paired.' Banking in recent years has become so interwoven with
the business and economic life of the community that innumer-
able regulations and restraints have been imposed upon it."' If
there ever was a business affected with a public interest (if that
clause may be used 7), banking assuredly falls within that class. 8
Whatever may be the objections, a statute permitting a competent
public official to make reasonable restrictions on banking deposits
when the financial life of a community is threatened is seemingly
a valid exercise of the police power.1
"'Home Building and Loan Ass 'n v. Blaisdell, supra n. 12; Edgar A. Levy
Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U. S. 242, 42 S. Ct. 289 (1921); Marcus Brown
Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170, 41 S. Ct. 465 (1921) (rent cases).
See Pestcoe v. Sixth Nat. Bank of Philadelphia, 171 Atl. 302 (Pa. 1934);
City of East Cleveland v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 5 F. Supp. 212 (1934).
But compare Ghingher v. Pearson, 168 Atl. 105 (Md. 1933).
In Zimmerman v. Gibbes, 172 S. E. 130 (S. C. 1933), affirmed in 54 S. Ct.
140, 78 L. Ed. 191 (1933), it was held that the emergency act of March, 1933,
prohibiting all persons from instituting any legal proceedings against any
state bank without the approval of the governor was constitutional. (Only
the question of due process was raised).
1Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349, 28 S. Ct. 529
(1908); Manigault v. Springs, 199 U. S. 473, 480, 26 S. Ct. 127 (1905),
where the court said: "This power, which in its various ramifications is
known as the police power, is an exercise of the sovereign right of the Gov-
ernment to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort and general welfare of
the people, and is paramount to any rights under contracts between in-
dividuals." But compare Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393,
43 S. Ct. 158 (1922); White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 646 (1871); Bronson v. Kin-
zie, 1 How. 311 (1843); Sturges v. Crowninshield, supra n. 2.
"An examination of the legislation affecting banks in any state will show
the extent that the business of banking has come under the control of the
state. See W. VA. REV. CoDm (1931) c. 31, art. 8, §§ 1-42.
'7 Nebbia v. New York, - U. S. -, 54 S. Ct. 505 (decided March 4,
1934).
"In Zimmerman v. Gibbes, supra n. 14, the state court at page 133 said:
"It is well established that the banking business is affected with a public
interest so as to be subject to legislative regulation and control as a part of
the police power of the state; and that the Legislature has authority to pre-
scribe and limit the method and manner of enforcing depositors' rights
against the banks and stockholders thereof."
"In re Opinion of the Justices, 278 Mass. 607, 611, 181 N. E. 833, 835
(1932), 80 A. L. A. 1021 (1933), where the court said: "The relations be-
tween savings banks and their depositors, so far as contractual in nature,
have been intered into subject to the future exercise of the police power by
the enactment of wholesome and reasonable laws for the common good. Laws
of that character do not impair the obligations of contracts."
In Home Building and Loan Assyn v. Blaisdell, supra n. 12, Hughes, C. J.,
at page 241 said: "It is manifest from this review of our decisions that there
has been a growing appreciation of public needs and of necessity of fin.ding
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It is submitted that outside of the objection and suggestion,
stated above, the decision in the present case is sound and whole-
some, and the fact that a one-hundred year old precedent is ap-
parently contra" to the statute of March, 1933, should not be con-
trolling in light of present-day needs.
-CHARLES W. CALDWELL.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES - ASSIGNMENT OF LIFE INSUR-
ANCE PoLIcY IN FRAUD OF CREDITORS. - In order to obtain $8000
from the plaintiff and to sell her certain notes, M told the plain-
tiff that he carried (and would continue to carry) from $75,000
to $100,000 in life insurance, payable to his estate. In fact, the
actual amount of such insurance was only $45,000. Less than two
months thereafter, M, while insolvent, transferred the policies to
his wife, the defendant, no consideration having been given for
the transfer. At M's death, a week later, the face value of the
policies was paid to the defendant. The appraisal of M's estate
indicated that the liabilities were far in excess of the assets.
Plaintiff sought by a suit in equity to reach the insurance monies.
It was held, reversing the lower court, that while the transfer was
constructively fraudulent as to the plaintiff, her recovery would
be limited to the cash-surrender value of the policies at the time
the change in beneficiaries was made. Mahood v. Maynard.'
It is well recognized that a life insurance contract is not one
of indemnity. Unlike fire and accident insurance, the event upon
which the sum is to be paid is certain to happen at a future time.'
The insurer promises to pay a fixed sum in consideration of an-
nuities paid it; the premiums constitute the consideration for the
ground for a rational compromise between individual rights and public wel-
fare." And further, it was added: "Where, in earlier days, it was thought
-that only the concerns of individuals or of classes were involved, and that
those of the State itself were touched only remotely, it has later been found
that the fundamental interests of the State are directly affected; and that
the question is no longer merely that of one party to a contract as against
another, but of the use of reasonable means to safeguard the economic struc-
ture upon which the good of all depends."
-OSturges v. Crowninshield, supra n. 14.
1171 S. E. 884 (W. Va. 1933).
'Patterson, Iwnurable Interest in Life (1918) 18 COL. L. REV. 381, 388.
Wurzburg v. N. Y. Life Insurance Co., 140 Tenn. 59, 203 S. W. 332 (1918).
'VANCE ON INSUIkNCE (2d ed., 1930) 80,
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